15 Countries Highest Risk That Collapse by Next Year
The truth is dark, but it’s something everyone needs to hear.
“Collapse” requires definition. Here it means rapid, large-scale loss of central government control, major state institutions failing, or descent into widespread civil war and state disintegration within ~2–3 years. Predicting exact collapse is impossible; instead, identify countries where credible risk of severe state failure by 2027 is meaningful based on current trajectories of political fragmentation, economic shock, elite fracture, external intervention, and insurgency. Factors considered: weak state capacity, severe economic crisis (inflation, currency collapse, debt default), active or escalating armed insurgencies, elite splits, loss of monopoly on violence, humanitarian breakdown, and major external interference.
High-risk cases (elevated probability of collapse or severe state failure by 2027)
Libya: Persistent fragmentation between rival governments, powerful militias, foreign backers, and a stagnant political process. Renewed fighting or collapse of a fragile power-sharing balance could produce rapid state failure.
Yemen: Ongoing multi-sided war, collapsing institutions, and chronic humanitarian catastrophe. A political or military shock—renewed large-scale offensives, foreign withdrawal, or fragmentation—could accelerate collapse in the near term.
Somalia: Longstanding governance gaps, fragile federal-local relations, and an active al-Shabaab insurgency. Setbacks in international support, internal elite splits, or major military defeats could tip parts of the country into broader loss of state control.
South Sudan: Deep elite polarization, recurring localized conflict, weak institutions, and economic distress. Renewed large-scale ethnic fighting or breakdown of power-sharing arrangements can lead to rapid unraveling.
Haiti: Severe political vacuum, gang rule in Port-au-Prince, economic collapse, and limited state capacity. Continued inability to restore security or credible governance creates a substantial near-term risk of de facto collapse in major population centers.
Significant risk (not imminent collapse but materially elevated chance of serious state failure)
Sudan: Though a major collapse occurred after the 2023 military–militia war, the country remains at high risk of further breakdown, wider fragmentation, or long-term partition depending on conflict dynamics and foreign intervention patterns.
Afghanistan: Taliban controls territory but faces economic collapse, governance legitimacy deficits, insurgent pockets, and humanitarian crisis. Renewed insurgency, external shock, or loss of central cohesion could produce deeper state failure in certain regions.
Lebanon: Economic collapse, dysfunctional politics, and Hezbollah’s armed autonomy create risk of institutional paralysis, local state-within-state dynamics, and potential escalation into broader collapse under a severe shock.
Burkina Faso / Mali / Niger (Sahel states): Military regimes, insurgencies, economic strain, and eroding public services increase the chance of deeper state failure or de facto fragmentation if insurgent gains accelerate or coups produce prolonged delegitimization.
Ethiopia: Tigray war and other internal conflicts undermined national cohesion. Broader spread of ethnic violence or renewed large-scale interstate war could precipitate severe loss of central control in regions.
Moderate risk or conditional vulnerability (vulnerable to collapse given severe shocks)
Pakistan: Economic crisis, political instability, and tensions between civilian elites and the military create vulnerability; outright collapse remains less likely absent a catastrophic chain of events, but regional destabilization could produce severe governance failures.
Venezuela: Deep economic collapse and institutional erosion have created de facto state dysfunction already; full institutional breakdown or fragmentation is possible if supply chains, security structures, or elite bargains break down further.
Myanmar: Military junta controls much territory but faces an increasingly effective armed resistance and economic collapse; prolonged insurgency and loss of control in border regions could produce de facto partition or collapse in parts of the country.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Chronic localized violence, weak state capacity, and resource-driven armed groups make certain provinces liable to state failure if conflict intensifies or international response weakens.
Argentina / Sri Lanka cases: severe economic crisis combined with weak institutions increases risk of deep instability, though collapse into total state failure is less probable within this timeframe.
Key caveats and framing
“Collapse” is a spectrum: full territorial collapse is rarer than regional state failure, institutional paralysis, or prolonged civil war. Many countries slip into de facto fragmentation without formal dissolution.
Time horizon matters: 2027 is near-term; most state collapses result from multi-year deterioration plus triggering shocks (civil war spark, elite split, economic default, major external intervention, natural disaster).
External actors and international responses matter: foreign military support, sanctions, peacekeeping, or emergency assistance can prevent collapse or, conversely, exacerbate it.
Prognostic uncertainty: forecasting political violence is inherently probabilistic. The listed countries are those where existing evidence—ongoing conflict, governance failure, economic collapse, elite fragmentation, and foreign entanglements—produces a meaningful near-term risk profile.
Practical indicators to watch through 2026–2027
Loss of government revenue or hyperinflation/currency collapse.
Major defections in security forces or breakdown in command-and-control.
Large-scale internal displacement and humanitarian access collapse.
Significant territorial gains by non-state armed groups.
Public elite fragmentation (competing governments, rival capitals).
Withdrawal or escalation of foreign backers and peacekeepers.
Examples of typical collapse pathways (illustrative)
Rapid military defeat of central forces by insurgents combined with elite flight and international disengagement (e.g., scenarios similar to 1990s state failures).
Fragmentation of the capital into gang-controlled enclaves, paralysis of national institutions, and humanitarian breakdown (Haiti-like trajectory).
Prolonged siege/war between rival factions with foreign proxies turning the conflict into de facto partition (Libya-like).
Summary judgment
By 2027 the countries with the most credible near-term risk of collapse or severe state failure are Libya, Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and Haiti, with Sudan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sahel states, and Myanmar carrying significant conditional risk. Many other fragile states remain vulnerable to collapse if compounded by major shocks. Continuous monitoring of the indicators above will give the best short-term signal of accelerating failure.